|
|
 | |  |
|
The State of Latin American Infrastructure and Logistics
The 2005 World Bank study of Latin American infrastructure revealed
some of the region’s onerous shortcomings in road, rail, and port
assets and the negative impact this has on the region’s ability to
trade and generate wealth. A common political rallying cry across the
region during the election season of 2006 was a promise to increase
infrastructure investment.
But creating an efficient
transportation system requires more than new roads and ports; it also
calls for the active participation of modern logistics companies. If
infrastructure is the hardware of a productive nation, then logistics
services is the software that drives it.
Over the last quarter
century, Latin America’s investment in transportation infrastructure
has failed to even keep up with population growth, while greater
investment levels in Asia have been paramount to that region’s wealth
creation. Latin America has also been unable to create its own large
scale competitive transportation service firms and has had mixed
success at attracting the investment and technology transfer of
international logistics service companies.
Why Logistics Matters to Latin America
Logistics
is a powerful economic enabler, one of the fundamental building blocks
of external and internal trade. Countries like the US and Germany,
which ranked 1st and 2nd in terms of supply chain efficiency according
to a recent study by SRI, derive major economic benefits from their
logistical strengths.
Enjoying lower logistics costs per
widget output enables factories to competitively deliver products and
procure inputs over a larger geography than equivalent factories in
less efficient countries. This allows industry to consolidate into
larger players, achieving economies of scale and efficiencies that
lower costs to consumers and raise profits and wages.
In
most industries, size matters and the ability to compete in global
markets or withstand global competition in one’s home market requires a
healthy environment for large company development. Latin America is
home to only a few dozen home-grown globally sized firms. Now as the
region tries to compete with Asian manufacturers, it is learning how
difficult it is to match the production costs of Chinese and South East
Asian firms that are ten times their size.
Logistical
inefficiencies tax the private sector that is trying to grow by
increasing the cost of goods sold, costs that either limit the ability
of a company to re-invest profits or cut into the savings and
investment of the consumer depending upon who bears the added cost.
Other than Mexico, which since NAFTA, efficiently imports products
from the US, transportation costs in most Latin American countries
represents 10-20% of the cost of imported goods. Worse still, while
the rest of the world has reduced logistics costs since 1980, in most
of Latin America, they have risen.
Financing supply chain inefficiencies
One
of the often overlooked costs of logistical inefficiency is the
financial burden of a slow moving supply chain. Companies in El
Salvador require on average 43 days to ship goods out of the country,
including the export documentation, port & terminal handling,
customs and inspection, and pre-arrival documentation. Comparatively,
an exporter in the Dominican Republic requires 17 days and a German
exporter only six days. Supplying competing supermarkets in Eastern
Canada, to illustrate by example, the German exporter can rotate the
same working capital 61 times per year (365 days / 6 days to export)
versus the El Salvadorian company that can only rotate its working
capital 8.5 times (365 days / 43 days to export). The central American
company must tie up seven times more capital than the German company,
and this when the cost of capital in San Salvador is probably two to
three times the comparative cost in Hamburg. The additional financial
costs for the Salvadorian firm are as much as 20 times that of the
German company. How can they compete?
Studies have shown that a
doubling of a country’s transportation costs lead to a reduction in
that country’s trade by 80% . Other Econometric studies have shown
that “On average, each additional day that a product is delayed prior
to being shipped reduces trade by at least 1 percent.
An
example that illustrates the region’s infrastructural shortcomings is
the Viaducto Uno in Caracas, Venezuela. This is the main artery
between Caracas, the country’s capital and its main airport, Maiquetia
International Airport (Simon Bolivar), and its second-most important
sea port of La Guaira). In January, 2006 this highway had to be closed
indefinitely. One of the main bridges on the artery was in danger of
collapsing due to a lack of maintenance. “Closing the route means that
tourists, cargo, and commuters will have to take alternate routes, the
shortest of which takes two hours and winds over the mountains in a
two-lane road, through some of Venezuela’s most crime-ridden slums” .
This in a country which is Latin America’s 2nd largest exporter of oil.
The
increased travel time, reduced security, and diversion of traffic to
other airports, (Valencia), all create additional friction in the
overall supply chain. The Viaducto Uno example is an isolated event in
one country. However, throughout Latin America we see other examples
of failed infrastructure, onerous regulations and inefficient
transportation companies, all of which contribute to the region’s high
logistical costs.
A recent study by SRI and sponsored by FedEx
draws a direct correlation between access and economic development.
Access is a broadly defined term in the study that combines the free
movement of goods in and out of markets as well as ready access to
information, communications, finance and services that act as enablers
of trade. What is evident is that countries cannot achieve either
domestic efficiency nor fulfill their trade potential without an
economy that enjoys physical access.
Latin America has not
been shy about negotiating trade agreements around the world. Mexico
and Chile each enjoy free trade with nations that comprise over 60% of
the world’s GDP. Yet, much of the region’s comparative trade advantage
is found in products that rely on swift or cost efficient logistics to
reach a market and maintain a consistent supply. Heavy commodities
which have been the lifeblood of Latin America’s recent export boom are
highly sensitive to transportation costs and delivery times. With close
to 50% of the world’s arable land, South America has a great potential
to be the leading horticultural exporter, yet its logistics systems do
not allow growers to reach prized markets in Japan, Europe or the US in
a timely fashion. Central America’s assembly industries, increasingly
under threat by Chinese factories, must compete on speed to market when
exporting northward but they lack the air cargo links and efficient
road links to earn their place in the US supply chain.
Why did investment dry up in Latin American infrastructure?
The
rate and direction of infrastructure investments is largely influenced
by government policy and administration. Either government budgets pay
for infrastructure or government policy shapes the investment climate
designed to attract private investment.
The last time that the
region enjoyed significant investment in its transportation
infrastructure was the 1970s when Latin America and its governments
were awash with cash thanks to record sales of natural resources. The
debt crisis of the 1980s beginning with Mexico led to a drastic
contraction in government spending as foreign debt tripled and payment
obligations drove several countries into devaluation triggered crisis.
The neo-liberal formula for fiscal turnaround in the 1990s as espoused
by the IMF and World bank, left little money for infrastructure and
recommended that private investors fill the place of public investment
in building the next generation of roads, ports and rail links.
However,
private investment in transportation infrastructure never fulfilled its
potential in the 1990s. To begin with investors were wary of Latin
America’s high country risk levels and placed large risk premiums on
financing projects in those markets, which only priced such projects
beyond a viable range. When foreign investors did venture into port
privatizations or bid on new road tolls, they were often discouraged by
the nepotist bidding processes that favored local players over
international consortia. Not surprisingly, Chile, which has invested
reasonably well in its infrastructure is also the least corrupt country
in the region, according to Transparency International. Brazil, whose
enormous export potential is at the mercy of its dysfunctional
logistics system, provides a case study of what went wrong with the
region over the last quarter century.
Dysfunctional Brazil
Brazil,
with a 2007 gross domestic product of US$1,835 billion (PPP), is now
the largest economy in Latin America. Exports have grown 12 fold over
the last 30 years but at only 15% of GDP, they remain far below their
potential in no small part because of the country’s terribly
inefficient distribution system. Brazilian exports on average take 39
days to go from the warehouse to clearing outbound customs. Brazil’s
total cost of transportation as a percentage of GDP is estimated to be
12.63%. In the USA the costs are only 8.19% of GDP. In terms of
Brazil’s GDP this is a difference of US$35 billion, more than the
country spends altogether on infrastructure and education in one year.
The
greatest cost differentials are found in administration, warehousing
and transportation. Increased warehousing costs come from an
inefficient system which does not allow for generalized Just-In-Time
services, so you need greater levels of stock. This in itself is an
inefficient use of capital which is tied up as stock inside warehouses
for a longer period of time.
Increased transportation costs
come from a greater level of friction in the transportation system.
Poor roads, old and badly maintained trucks, onerous regulations, a
high number of accidents are all signs of market inefficiencies which
slow the movement of goods and raise transportation costs. Brazil, for
instance, has 10 times the mortality rate on its roads as the USA.
Financing Infrastructure – A Tale of Two Countries
The
massive price tags of infrastructure and long-term financing needs
often lead Latin American governments to seek credit from the World
bank, IADB, and IFC. Some countries have also succeeded in attracting
private investors to help fund transportation projects.
Two
contrasting examples of how infrastructural projects were recently
developed in Latin America will showcase the environment in which Latin
American Logistics develops. In 1995 the World Bank began the
appraisal of a US$300M loan to Brazil, for a Federal highway
decentralization project. The project was approved in 1997, and the
results were appraised in June of 2006.
The report declared that
the overall performance by the Bank and the borrower were satisfactory
but it went on to highlight several factors that impacted, delayed and
weakened the results of the project. The first factor is the weak
fiscal position of the Brazilian government, and its inability to push
through fiscal reforms. This resulted in insufficient funds with which
to fulfill its public investment obligations. The Brazilian government
did not have money to maintain its existing highways, let alone embark
on a decentralization project. The second factor mentioned was
political opposition to the project as a response to perceived loss of
influence by federal politicians with the reorganization of the Federal
Transport Ministry. There was also strong political opposition to
increasing private involvement in infrastructure at a time when the
region was sharply rejecting neo-liberal reform.
In a
constrained fiscal environment, government focused on short term
budgetary obligations, like paying the civil servants their salaries,
social security, pension and social programs obligations. With neither
the Cardoso nor Lula first term governments able to reform Brazil’s
bloated pension and social security programs, they continued to drain
the government of needed resources. Then there was the productivity of
the Federal Road Administration. This was a department in flux, as the
old DNER was re-structured into the new more efficient structure of the
DNIT. The resulting departmental re-engineering took time, during which
performance and execution efficiencies were reduced.
Costs
increases also impacted the project. “The main reasons for these cost
increases include: (a) higher degradation of road condition (resulting
from large delays in contracting of works) which increased
rehabilitation costs; (b) irregularity of payments to contractors which
led to various work stoppages, and thus requirements to pay interests
on late payments, pay higher price adjustments, and revise work
schedules; and (c) an increase in the price of bituminous material of
close to 100% over the project implementation period”. Furthermore,
financing costs ballooned with the currency depreciated in 1999.
Total financing costs were 36% higher than originally forecast in the planning stages.
One
of the general conclusions of the report is that the project was
affected by “fiscal difficulties and weak political coordination”, and
that “despite lots of efforts both on the federal Government and Bank
sides, no immediate solution could be found to resolve these issues.”
Colombia and Infrastructure Development
Colombia
has a plan to invest almost US$11B in transportation and logistics
infrastructure between 2004 and 2010, most of which is destined for
highway construction. The majority of the financing is to come from the
government’s budget, which in turn is financed by a variety of
government taxes and charges, including road tolls, airport taxes, exit
taxes at the airport, and other public sources.
The Colombian
government, however, has earmarked certain projects for private
investment, both as a means of spreading costs but also to invite new
ideas and best practices from the private sector. But private sector
investment has proven fickle when macro-economic conditions or the
political climate grow polemic, as they did in 2000 and 2001.
Results
to date (2008) of Colombia’s infrastructure expansion have been largely
positive. Projects in road, air and ports were finished ahead of time
and within budget and succeeded in dramatically improving transport
efficiency. Most visible have been the positive results of both ports
and urban transportation.
The downside of the project is the
failure of the market to deliver higher traffic volumes on private
concessions, which triggered guarantee penalties to the tune of $700M
against the government. The volume guarantees were a risky but
necessary incentive utilized by the Colombian government to entice a
skeptical private sector. The mixed results demonstrate the need to
reach out to the logistics industry and involve them in all stages of
the project from feasibility to implementation to ensure that the
infrastructure fits the needs of the market.
Politically,
Colombia was successful where Brazil failed because they had
wide-spread support for the infrastructure plans across federal
ministries but also at the state level. With its political ducks in a
row, the government was able to pass through five decrees within a
period of two months in 2003, which helped to restructure the
transportation ministry and overcome existing regulatory bottlenecks.
The role of PPP in Infrastructural Development
Colombia
started off with a stronger fiscal position than Brazil, and was able
to cover a large part of the infrastructural development with the use
of public funds, raised from taxes, international loans and project
bonds. Colombia was also successful in attracting private investment,
and were able to push through institutional reforms that allowed for
more efficient regulation and management of the investment projects.
Colombia’s approach to transportation infrastructure improvement may
be the most viable model today for Latin America, a combination of
significant public investment in basic projects along with the
construction of business conditions to lure private investors in more
specialized fields where their technology transfer is best utilized.
Bringing Modern Logistics to Latin America
A
vital component of globalization is the role played by modern logistics
service companies that bring together supplier and buyer around the
world. Building a healthy climate to entice the arrival of these
companies should be viewed in a similar light as attracting R&D
investment. Logistics service providers and the experts they employ
bring the know-how and often the global know-who to local companies
seeking foreign markets and globally connected supply channels.
Logistics
companies are traditionally very conservative when it comes to
expanding into new markets. They almost always follow their biggest
customers. Latin America, a region historically wrought with political
and economic risk, has attracted limited investment from logistics
companies, almost all of whom have taken an asset light approach to
market entry, and to date have invested only in the region’s largest
and safest markets.
Demand for Latin American logistics, both
international and domestic has been driven, above all, by foreign
direct investment. Multinationals bring with their investment a global
network of suppliers and customers and a scale of operations that
demands significant logistics spending. With enough FDI in any one
market, the competitive landscape is changed, and large domestic
companies begin to adopt the use of outsourced logistics in a bid to
regain lost market share.
International logistics is also
driven by manufactured products and specialized needs like dangerous or
refrigerated cargo, both of which require more costly logistics
planning and handling. Nations that trade beyond the norms of their
market size (Panama, Puerto Rico, Chile) consume significant levels of
international logistics and as a result have attracted global logistics
providers. In a region known for its commodity exports and finished
good imports, the in-bound logistics market is at least 50% larger than
its out-bound equivalent, adding a logistical challenge to a region
which exports, its commoditieson on ships and imports its value added
goods by plane and truck.
Logistics demand across the
region’s 20 markets is highly concentrated in two countries, which
together comprise 90 of Soth American GDP. These 2 countries are Mexico
and Brazil. 79% of regional demand. Brazil’s market is described as in
the early to middle stages of growth. After the lost decades in the
80s due to political risk and capital flight, investment is streaming
back into Brazil and since 2004, Brazil’s logistics market led the
region with 20%+ growth, built on four engines: GDP growth, growth in
FDI, trade growth and an appreciation of the Real.
Mexico’s
logistics market, like its economy, is split into two distinct
segments: the export economy that relies on cross-border logistics for
95% of its traffic and the domestic economy. The logistics market
servicing Mexico’s exporters is sophisticated and relatively mature
with consolidation of suppliers ongoing. 300 multinationals are
responsible for 90% of Mexico’s exports. Mexico’s domestic economy is
driven by consumption, which has enjoyed a renaissance since 2000, when
the Peso regained significant purchasing power and consumer credit
began its run of record growth. The sectors that most buy logistics
in Mexico are now dominated by multinational players so demand for
logistics has grown quickly in recent years and should continue to do
so.
Other important logistics markets, are Panama, Chile, and
Colombia. Global logistics players, have to date focused on Mexico
and Brazil, and have only dabbled in the the other markets. In the
safe-haven of dollarized Panama, and to a lesser degree in Chile and
Colombia, where currency and security risk respectively, have kept some
players away. Most logistics players have structured their operations
in these smaller markets in an asset-light fashion, either through a
partnership with an independent agent or through a skeleton Greenfield
operation that subcontracts all mid and lower value service segments.
Such associations limit technology transfer because the foreign company
does not want to lose possession of its proprietary software or
methodology.
What continues to hold back Logistics in Latin America?
Significant
barriers exist to normal market maturation in Latin America, which will
be overcome in a few markets but could take a generation or more to
conquer in most countries.
Trust – Latin America, like many
emerging markets is plagued by mistrust of its core institutions, most
especially its inefficient legal system. Without an objective judicial
infrastructure, contract enforcement becomes difficult, even impossible
if one of the contractual partners, has the resources at his disposal
with which to manipulate a favorable legal outcome. In this
environment, Latin American entrepreneurs are naturally hesitant to
trust vital functions like inventory control, product distribution, and
billing to unknown outside suppliers. This cultural factor is a huge
impediment to outsourcing. It alone explains why even large domestic
firms outsource at half the rate of multinationals and mid-size firms
are yet to outsource en-mass.
In markets where FDI has helped
spawn an awareness amongst Latin companies of the need to outsource
(Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Panama), local companies are more
likely to trust their coveted internal functions to a foreign supplier
than a local one.
Currency Risk – Every market in Latin
America except Mexico and Panama is vulnerable to considerable currency
volatility risk. The problem begins with the fact that any person or
business that can save money moves it off-shore. The region keeps $1.2
trillion in savings outside of its borders. That money comes into the
region in good times to take advantage of significant growth
opportunities but can quickly leave at the first sign of weakness. The
lack of local savings creates an under-capitalized banking system that
in turn relies on foreign debt. To manage foreign debt, Latin America
must generate dollars, which it does through its exports. However, its
export mixture is made up of commodities, whose elastic-demand
generates volatile pricing. Imports to the region, however, are made
up of inelastic-demand finished goods whose prices do not drop when
demand falls. The result is a very volatile balance of trade. Without
enough foreign investment, running a trade deficit soon sparks
devaluation.
Mexico has broken some of its currency volatility
by building a vast assembly-export industry that produces branded
products for the US market. Though these factories can be built and
torn down relatively quickly, most are built to last and are sustained
by a stable US market. That guarantees Mexico a less volatile source
of dollars than its Latin neighbors. Panama sustains the parity of its
currency with the US$ through the constant flow of dollarized service
fees generated by its canal, banking and logistics services.
Trucking
regulations and lack of standards – In several markets, regulations are
made that inhibit the consolidation and modernization of Latin American
trucking. In Brazil, trucks that pass state borders face a state tax,
based upon the value of merchandise. This effectively converts a
potentially large and competitive Brazilian trucking industry into a
highly fragmented supply of small and mid-size trucking firms operating
largely within state borders. Without scale, trucking firms cannot
achieve the profit levels needed to modernize.
In Mexico,
foreigners are prohibited from owning any stake in domestic truck cargo
services. Without foreign capital, Mexican trucking remains woefully
behind the standards demanded of its clients, including logistics firms
that subcontract Mexican truckers.
A general lack of truck
safety, environmental compliance and driver safety regulations allows
small trucking firms and independents across Latin America to keep
their dilapidated fleets on the road. With no depreciation to amortize
in their pricing, small players keep market prices down, and trucking
profits near zero. This prevents Latin American trucking from
modernizing.
Customs Reform – When asked what holds back their
investments in Latin America, the largest logistics providers will
start their laundry list with the desperate need for customs reform.
Governments across Latin America, with few exceptions have made great
strides to remove the administrative and customs barriers facing their
nation’s exporters but have left importers continually frustrated by
the bureaucracy and expense of bringing a foreign product into the
country. For Integrators like FedEx, UPS or DHL, any mis-match between
in-bound and out-bound volumes and speeds leads to flying empty return
planes, i.e. operating losses that make routes inviable. In Taipei, an
inbound airplane full of cargo is cleared through customs within 18
minutes of landing. In Buenos Aires, it can take more than one week.
The Chinese Solution
China’s
unique approach to transport and logistics development could provide
some useful lessons to Latin American governments and the private
sector that they serve. China’s Sinotrans is a government corporation
establish to manage a series of joint-venture partnerships with the
world’s leading logistics players in an effort to tap the private
sector’s knowledge of logistics and develop infrastructure that serves
the needs of export and import customers.
In order for UPS or
DHL to enter the Chinese market, they were obliged to partner with
Sinotrans, creating a joint-venture company that was eventually sold
back to the foreign company in a model similar to a BOT (Build operate,
transfer) scheme. In the case of UPS, Sinotrans garnered US$100
Million when it sold its share of their joint venture back to the
Atlanta based corporation. This was still a great deal for UPS since
“UPS reported export volume in China grew 129% over the third quarter
of 2004 compared to the same period in 2003. FedEx also bought out its
Chinese partner for US$400M in January 2006.
To attract the
foreign investment, Sinotrans works with the logistics company to
survey their infrastructure needs, identifying routing inefficiencies
that constrict the area of logistics that their investment is designed
to open up, be it a new region or sector. Sinotrans will then provide
investment guarantees to back up an infrastructure investment work plan
which is paid for in conjunction with the rolling out of the investment
of the foreign logistics company.
Beyond infrastructure,
Sinotrans provides basic labor and middle management, trained in
logistics programs established in China, in order to guarantee a
certain level of skilled an semi-skilled labor such that the foreign
company only has to bring over high level management to run their
Chinese operations. This model brings with it the tacit obligation to
transfer global logistics knowledge into China.
What is so
successful about the Chinese model is the ability to marry
infrastructure investment directly with viable logistics business
models that are particularly focused on facilitating trade.
Logistics
companies, with their investment power, their expertise, global
networks, and competitive impact have the potential to single-handedly
transform some of Latin America’s smaller economies into efficient
trading nations if provided with the business and operating environment
needed for them to invest.
A potential solution brewing in Brazil
Today,
Brazil is in a better position financially, economically and even
politically to tackle its infrastructure deficiencies.
Sensing
an historic opportunity, on August 24th 2006, ten Brazilian
transportation and logistics associations presented to the presidential
candidates at the 1st National Infrastructure and Logistics Conference
a comprehensive plan to overhaul the country’s transport system. The
bold plan recommends that the government underwrite US$40 billion in
annual investments over the next five years (2% of GDP), to clear
bottlenecks in the Brazilian logistics system, including the formation
of a new depoliticized Infrastructure and Logistics Secretariat, to
deal with degrading infrastructure, exorbitant taxation, excessive
regulation, and an obsolescent vehicular park.
It also
recommends that domestic and foreign logistics service companies be
brought into the plan as partners in what would be a joint effort
between government, the private sector and academia. Similar to the
Chinese plan, their idea is to use logistics service companies and
logistics experts as sounding boards to any government devised
infrastructure plan, so that Brazil does not repeat the mistakes of the
past when it built unviable or unnecessary transport infrastructure.
The
idea is in principal a good one but Brazil is a decentralized political
system and state governors remain a key obstacle to needed deregulation
of Brazil’s trucking system. Today, most state border crossings come
with the levying of onerous state transport taxes. Instead of boasting
some of the world’s largest trucking companies, as the size of its
economy warrants, Brazil’s trucking industry is highly fragmented due
to the inability of trucking firms, in say, the state of Sao Paulo,
being able to compete in the state of Minas Gerais. Similarly,
transportation sensitive industries fail to consolidate as they might
if the trucking market were truly national. For any transport strategy
to work in Brazil, political interests must be recognized and dealt
with in proposed solutions.
Conclusions
Transportation
and Logistics in today’s world are the underpinnings of the globalized
economy. Countries with more efficient domestic supply chains can
better integrate into the global economic system, and have a
significant competitive advantage in what is now a global race for
jobs, wealth and development. Latin America, with its wealth in
commodities and raw materials makes most of its foreign exchange
through exports. Lack of investment in its transportation and logistics
system, (infrastructure, companies and management), have created
bottlenecks with significant dampening effects on, its ability to earn
foreign exchange, consumption, production, and each country’s economic
development and growth. Weak institutional, political and fiscal
systems are some of the reasons for the historical under-investment in
the transportation and logistics system.
But the need for
investment just to maintain parity with the economy and population is
so vast that only an integrated association of all the components in
the transportation system can begin to address and resolve the
transportation and Logistics problems that Latin America faces.
Governments must work hand in hand with funding agencies, and private
enterprise to plan and build one integrated transportation and
logistics system that create efficiencies and economies of scale not
just across countries, but across regions and ultimately continents.
This is already occurring slowly between the US and Mexico as a result
of NAFTA.
A holistic strategy can only come from a
multi-disciplinary team made up of all elements in the supply chain,
including public institutions, private enterprise and global funding
bodies. Latin America has a logistics system that lags behind its
economic systems. Catching up is a task that is too large for any one
organization or institution.
In Colombia, the government is
not only expanding its own commitment but is reaching out to lending
agencies as a 3rd source of funding. More importantly it is effectively
involving private players in their infrastructure development plans.
Its approach may be the model to emulate across the region. Some
governments, who can exercise sufficient centralized authority and have
the funds to build infrastructure, can emulate the Sinotrans model,
creating joint-ventures with logistics companies that help incubate
domestic logistics skills as well as viable transport systems.
An
important set of players in the private sector that cannot be ignored
are the integrators, FedEx, UPS, DHL and TNT. These Integrators are
the most aggressive logistics investors around the world. They bring
with them logistics expertise, seasoned managers, state-of-the-art
technology, and an instant connection to a global trading network. But
luring them to risk more than an asset-light approach requires a bold
and integrated plan from government, backed up with a business friendly
regulatory environment, a commitment to free trade and customs reform,
significant public financing resources and a track record of
transparency.
Sources:
- World Bank, Infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Developments and Key Challenges, 2005
- SRI International, How Greater Access is Changing the World, August, 2006
- 2006, Doing Business In 2006: Creating Jobs, The International Bank For Reconstruction And Development / The World Bank
- Limao,
N. and A. J. Venables (2001), “Infrastructure, Geographical
Disadvantage, and Transport Costs”; World Bank Economic Review 15.
- Gregory Wilpert, Thursday, Jan 05, 2006,– Venezuelanalysis.com
- BP 2005 Statistical Review of World Energy
- Transparency International Global Corruption Index, 2006, June 30, 2005, 2006 The Associated Press
- Maurício Pimenta Lima, Janeiro/2006, CEL – do Coppead/UFRJ., Custos logísticos na economia brasileira
- ISEV, 2005, Buenos Aires
- Aymeric-Albin
Meyer, June 2006, “Implementation Report on a Loan in the Amount of
$300M to the Federative Republic of Brazil for a Highway
Decentralization Projects”, World Bank
- Logistics Management, 12/1/2004
- Sarah Bowling, January 30, 2006, Logistics Management
- Associação Nacional do Transporte de Cargas e Logística (NTC & Logística)
- Associação Nacional dos Usuários do Transporte de Carga (Anut)
- Associação Nacional de Transportes Ferroviários (ANTF)
- Associação do Desenvolvimento Multimodal (ADM)
- Agência de Desenvolvimento Tietê-Paraná (ADTP)
- Associação Brasileira de Terminais Portuários (ABTP),
- Frente
Nacional dos Permissionários de Recintos Alfandegados – composta pela
Associação Brasileira de Terminais e Recintos Alfandegados (ABTRA),
Associação Brasileira de Terminais de Contêineres de Uso Público
(Abratec) e Associação Nacional das Empresas Permissionárias de Portos
Secos (ANPS) – e pelo Centro das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo
(Ciesp)
- Tecnologistica Online
| |
 | |  |
|
|
|
|
